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Laissez-faire leadership has received much less attention than have the 3 transactional leadership 
dimensions of the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ). However, laissez-faire leadership 
has shown strong negative relationships with various leadership criteria, and the absence of 
leadership (laissez-faire leadership) may be just as important as is the presence of other types of 
leadership. This article focuses on a single type of laissez-faire leadership (i.e., the lack of response 
to subordinate performance). Using a reinforcement perspective, the authors developed measures 
and examined the effects of the lack of performance-contingent reinforcement in 2 forms: reward 
omission (leader nonreinforcement of good subordinate performance) and punishment omission 
(leader nonreinforcement of poor subordinate performance). They found strong evidence in support 
of the construct validity of the new measures and found that omission was related to follower 
satisfaction with the leader, subordinate-rated leader effectiveness, subordinate-perceived role 
clarity, and supervisor-rated subordinate performance. 
 
 Many approaches to the study of leadership exist (see Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2006) but, according to 
Judge and Piccolo (2004), “transformational-transactional leadership theory dominates current thinking 
about leadership research” (p. 762). Although the study of transformational leadership is certainly not new 
(see House, 1977), the publication of Bass’s original theory (Bass, 1985) and the development of the 
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) appear to have stimulated the majority of recent research in 
this area (Hunt, 1999; Yukl, 2006). 
 To examine eight leadership dimensions that constitute what is now called the “full range leadership 
theory” (Antonakis, Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 2003; Avolio & Bass, 1991; Bass & Avolio, 1997), Bass and 
his associates (e.g., Bass & Avolio, 1993, 1997) developed Form 5X of the MLQ. The MLQ-5X contains four 
scales that are designed to measure aspects of transformational leadership. The scales include Idealized 
Influence, Individualized Consideration, Intellectual Stimulation, and Inspirational Motivation. The MLQ-5X 
also contains three scales that assess transactional leadership; these scales are Contingent Reward, Active 
Management by Exception, and Passive Management by Exception. One scale measuring nonleadership—
Laissez-Faire Leadership—is part of the MLQ-5X (Antonakis et al., 2003; Bass & Avolio, 1997). 
 Bass and his colleagues have argued that transactional leadership is a necessary precondition if 
transformational leadership is to be effective (Avolio, 1999). By providing direction and focus, transactional 
leadership makes the use of transformational behaviors less confusing and ambiguous. From a somewhat 
different perspective, Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie (2006) seem to agree with this 
assessment and further suggest that “leader reward and punishment behavior is . . . the heart of what is 
called transactional leadership” (p. 114). 
 As measured by the MLQ, leader contingent reward behavior involves leaders clarifying 
expectations and providing rewards when subordinate performance warrants them. Active management by 
exception involves leaders monitoring follower performance and administering some form of intervention 
(e.g., punishment) when poor performance is found, and passive management by exception involves leaders 
waiting until problems become apparent before they take action. The MLQ Contingent Reward scale has 
shown strong positive relationships with subordinate perceptions of leader effectiveness and satisfaction 
with the leader (rs = .45-.55), whereas active management by exception has shown mild positive 
relationships (rs = .13-.24). In contrast, passive management by exception has shown mild negative 
relationships (rs = —.14 to —.27) with the same variables (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). 
 In contingent reward and active and passive management by exception, the leader intervenes in 
response either to good or to poor performance (Tejeda, Scandura, & Pillai, 2001). However, unlike these 
three transactional leadership dimensions, laissez- faire leader behavior is not related to follower 
performance. Rather, it is characterized by avoiding decisions, hesitating to take action, and being absent 
when needed. Judge and Piccolo (2004) found that MLQ laissez-faire leadership had strong significant 
negative correlations with leader effectiveness (r = —.54) and satisfaction with the leader (r = —.58) and 
concluded that “the absence of leadership (laissez-faire leadership) is nearly as important as the presence of 
other forms of leadership” (p. 765). In a more recent empirical study, Skogstad, Einarsen, Torsheim, Aas- 
land, and Hetland (2007) agreed with this assertion and concluded that “laissez-faire leadership behavior is a 
destructive leadership behavior” (p. 80) that warrants much more future research. 
 Broad and global in nature, the MLQ laissez-faire measure consists of several types of nonleadership 
(i.e., avoiding responsibility, not responding to problems, being absent when needed, failing to follow up, 
resisting expressing views, and delaying responses). It is unclear, as a result of this multidimensionality, 
which subtypes of laissez-faire behavior may have the greatest impact on subordinates. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Judge and Piccolo (2004) recommended that laissez-faire behavior be studied in more depth 
and suggested that transactional leadership be envisioned as a continuum, with contingent reward behavior 
on one end and laissez-faire leadership on the other. (Active management by exception and passive 
management by exception would then be positioned between the two ends of the continuum.) 
 Although the data suggest that the negative effects of nonleadership are substantial, the literature 
on laissez-faire leadership is sparser than the literature on other MLQ dimensions (Dumdum, Lowe, & 
Avolio, 2002; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). For example, in their recent meta-analysis, Judge 
and Piccolo (2004) found 73 studies of contingent reward, 53 studies of active management by exception, 40 
studies of passive management by exception, and only 26 studies of laissez-faire leadership. In very few of 
these studies was laissez-faire the focal variable of interest or the subject of any theoretical development. 
As the primary responsibilities of a leader include monitoring and responding to the performance of 
subordinates (Yukl, 2006), it is unfortunate that so little theory and research has focused on laissez-faire 
leadership. Research strongly supports the idea that behavior is a function of its consequences (Luthans & 
Kreitner, 1985). If a leader provides no response to the performance of followers, their performance may be 
controlled by factors other than the leader and may therefore be unacceptable or inconsistent. Given these 
facts, it seemed appropriate for us to explore inactive leadership from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. In this article, therefore, we adopt a reinforcement approach and introduce the concepts of 
leader reward omission and punishment omission, leader nonresponse to good and poor subordinate 
performance, respectively. 
Reward Omission and Punishment Omission 
 The major defining characteristic of laissez-faire leadership as measured by the MLQ is the lack of 
leader response to a variety of potential stimuli in a variety of situations. Laissez-faire leadership does not 
appear to be motivated and intentional; it is simply the lack of any response to subordinates’ needs and 
performance. In an attempt to understand inactive or nonresponsive leadership, we focus on the lack of 
leader responses to one particular stimulus, subordinate performance, both good and poor (which we call 
reward omission and punishment omission, respectively). We believe that nonresponse to good and poor 
performance will produce both important and different effects. 
 Komaki (1998) noted that nonresponse to undesired behavior (i.e., punishment omission) has not 
been considered in organizational research; nevertheless, it has strong effects and should be examined. The 
same can be said for the nonreinforcement of desired behavior (i.e., reward omission). For example, in a 
series of laboratory experiments, Pithers (1985) found that the lack of appropriate reinforcement following 
a desired behavior resulted in a decline in performance over time; this nonreinforcement was termed 
omission conditioning. When this finding is extrapolated to an organizational setting, failure to reinforce 
desired subordinate performance is a form of omission conditioning and clearly is not a desirable leadership 
behavior. A leader who withholds reinforcement, whether intentionally or unintentionally, may very well 
produce negative consequences, particularly when subordinate performance is high (subordinate 
performance would be expected to decline). On the other hand, proponents of “OB mod” (organizational 
behavior modification; e.g., Luthans & Kreitner, 1985) have argued that nonresponse to poor subordinate 
performance may not extinguish the undesirable behavior and will do nothing to elicit the desired behavior 
(Petrock, 1978). 
 Nonresponse to good performance is likely to have more negative effects than will nonresponse to 
poor performance. These effects can be explained with attribution theory (Weiner, 1985), equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), and the organizational justice literature (e.g., Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975). Attributions can be made to an external source of responsibility, outside the individual’s control, or to 
an internal source, within the individual’s control. 
 On the basis of attribution theory, poor subordinate performance is likely to be attributed by the 
subordinate to environmental factors beyond his or her control. Consequently, leader nonresponse would 
probably be seen as equitable or fair, because the subordinate would most likely not feel responsible for the 
poor performance. Subordinate affective reactions to punishment omission should therefore be neutral (or, 
at most, mildly positive), and subordinate performance would be expected to be unaffected. This is so 
because the undesirable behavior (poor performance) may be under the control of reinforcements 
administered by a source other than the supervisor and therefore is likely to continue (Petrock, 1978). 
Additionally, the lack of supervisor response to poor subordinate performance may not be associated with 
job dissatisfaction, because the subordinate may not expect reinforcement when performance is poor (cf. 
Locke, 1976). 
 Current leader reinforcement approaches seem to predict that nonreinforced subordinate good 
performance will lead to negative subordinate affective and behavioral responses (e.g., dissatisfaction and 
decreases in performance; Howell & Costley, 2006; Komaki, 1998). An explanation for this prediction is that 
good subordinate performance is likely to be attributed by the subordinate to his or her own effort and 
ability. Thus, a nonresponse is more likely to be seen as inequitable or unfair, as the subordinate would feel 
responsible and deserving of rewards for the good performance. Furthermore, expectancy theory suggests 
that if the link between the performance of the individual and the outcomes he or she receives is missing, 
subsequent motivation will decline over time (Vroom, 1964). Subordinate reactions to a leader’s 
nonresponse to good performance should therefore be moderately to strongly negative, both in terms of 
affective (e.g., job satisfaction) and behavioral (e.g., motivation and job performance) responses. 
Additionally, both types of nonreinforcement might very well result in role ambiguity or confusion about job 
expectations on the part of subordinates (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970). 
 As shown in Table 1, probable leader responses to good subordinate performance can be 
conceptualized as varying from contingent 
 
 
reward to reward omission; probable leader responses to poor subordinate performance can range from 
active and passive management by exception and contingent punishment to punishment omission. Laissez-
faire leadership, which is generally nonresponsive, is not included in Figure 1 but can be seen as a neutral 
stimulus that occurs under both good and poor subordinate performance. We believe that this figure more 
fully represents the spectrum of likely performance- related transactional leader behaviors than does the 
continuum suggested by Judge and Piccolo (2004). 
 The above discussion suggests that researchers could profitably sharpen our conceptualization of 
inactive leadership by considering what we call “reward omission” and “punishment omission.” Therefore, 
our purposes in this study are as follows: (a) to present a conceptualization of typical leader reinforcement 
behavior as falling on a performance-related continuum that ranges from nonreinforcement to the provision 
of a high degree of performance- contingent reinforcement; (b) to develop and assess the construct validity 
of scales that measure the two types of omission; and (c) to test the new scales for concurrent and 
predictive validity and for an “augmentation effect” beyond the effects of existing MLQ measures, using a 
set of meaningful dependent variables (including variables that have been examined in prior MLQ studies). 
 There are a number of ways to examine the issue of whether the two types of perceived leader 
omission are meaningful constructs. We conducted four separate studies. In the first study, we conducted a 
content adequacy assessment to determine if the two constructs were theoretically independent from 
laissez-faire leadership and management by exception. In Study 2, we conducted confirmatory factor 
analyses to examine the discriminant validity of the new measures. In Study 3, we used correlation and 
hierarchical regression analysis to determine whether support for the omission constructs could be obtained 
with MLQ laissez-faire and transactional leadership dimensions as well as three dependent variables. Finally, 
in Study 4, we employed correlation analysis to examine the usefulness of leader reward and punishment 
omission in “predicting” subsequent subordinate job performance. 
Study 1: A Test of Content Validity 
 Because it was necessary (for construct validity purposes) to demonstrate that our two new 
omission constructs (and their operationalizations) were theoretically different from similar existing 
constructs (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), we examined content validity employing the active and passive 
management by exception and laissez-faire leadership measures of the MLQ. Although active and passive 
management by exception may appear somewhat similar, factor analytic research suggests that they are 
perceived as separate constructs by respondents. However, laissez- faire leadership has been perceived as 
being similar to passive management by exception; these two leadership styles have had consistently strong 
intercorrelations and have sometimes formed a single passive leadership dimension in studies that used 
factor- analytic techniques (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999; Den Hartog, Van Muijen, & Koopman, 1997; Druskat, 
1994). Laissez-faire leadership also has had relationships with dependent variables that are generally 
negative, like those of passive management by exception, except that they have been stronger (Bass, Avolio, 
Jung, & Berson, 2003). 
 Two explanations seem most plausible for the consistent and strong relationship that exists 
between laissez-faire leadership and passive management by exception. First, managers who tend to use 
passive management by exception also use laissez-faire leadership (so the behaviors covary in tandem). 
Second, respondents may have a difficult time distinguishing between the two constructs (i.e., the MLQ 
items measuring the two constructs are seen as tapping the same domain or construct). Thus, with the 
passive management by exception and laissez-faire measures, one important question is whether the MLQ 
items theoretically represent two different constructs or a single construct or, in other words, whether the 
passive management by exception and laissez-faire dimensions are content valid. For leader reward 
omission and punishment omission, one would hope that any items developed to measure these constructs 
would be seen as theoretically and empirically distinct from each other and from passive management by 
exception and laissez-faire leadership. The reason for concern about distinctiveness from passive 
management by exception and laissez-faire leadership is that these two dimensions assess aspects of 
inactive leadership and may therefore be confused with leader behavior that does not reward good or 
punish poor performance. 
Schriesheim, Powers, Scandura, Gardiner, and Lankau (1993) and Schriesheim, Cogliser, Scandura, Lankau, 
and Powers (1999) have
argued that “content adequacy” (content validity) is an important first step in the construct validation 
process and that content adequacy should be assessed immediately after a measure has been developed 
but prior to its utilization in a research study. In Study 1, we conduced a content adequacy assessment using 
an analysis of variance technique developed by Hinkin and Tracey (1999). The analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
technique eliminates the use of subjective judgment for item retention; ANOVA provides a direct empirical 
test for determining item distinctiveness. Additionally, ANOVA is very simple and straightforward. Finally, 
this technique can be utilized with small sample sizes and allows researchers to address both practical and 
statistical differences (see Cohen, 1969; Hinkin & Tracey, 1999). 
 When this assessment procedure is employed, items from similar yet different measures are 
presented to respondents along with theoretical definitions of each of the constructs. In this case, we used 
the MLQ-5X (Bass & Avolio, 1993) passive management by exception and laissez-faire items, in addition to 
items measuring leader reward and punishment omission. The reward omission items included two items 
from the Contingent Reward subscale of the Leader Reward and Punishment Questionnaire (LRPQ; Pod- 
sakoff et al., 2006; Podsakoff, Todor, Grover, & Huber, 1984; Podsakoff, Todor, & Skov, 1982). These were 
reverse-scored Contingent Reward Items 09 and 10: “My good performance often goes unacknowledged by 
my supervisor” and “I often perform well in my job and still receive no praise from my supervisor.” These 
two items have been shown to be problematic, as they have not loaded on their appropriate factors in a 
multisample assessment of LRPQ validity (Schriesheim, Hinkin, & Tetrault, 1991). We developed four 
additional reward omission items and six additional punishment omission items in a deductive manner, in 
that we began with the theoretical definitions and then created items that were conceptually consistent 
with the definitions. 
Sample and Procedure 
 Sample. The sample consisted of 62 MBA students at a medium-sized university in the southern 
United States. Of those sampled, the average age was 29 years and 69% were male. As noted in Schriesheim 
and associates (Schriesheim et al., 1993, 1999), the two fundamental requirements for individuals partici-
pating in this task are sufficient intellectual ability to rate the items and a lack of any theoretical biases. We 
considered graduate students appropriate subjects for this task. Questionnaires that took approximately 15 
minutes to complete were administered during normal class time. Explicit written and verbal instructions 
were provided prior to administration, and the responses were anonymous. 
 Procedure. The respondents rated each of the 27 items (7 passive management by exception, 8 
laissez-faire, 6 reward omission, and 6 punishment omission) on the extent to which they believed the item 
was consistent with each of the four theoretical definitions. Response choices ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(completely). Each rating form consisted of four pages plus a cover page of instructions and examples (see 
Schriesheim et al., 1993, 1999, for illustrations). The definition of one of the four behaviors was presented at 
the top of each separate page and was followed by a randomized listing of all the items. We took extreme 
care to ensure that the definitions accurately described each different behavior and that the passive 
management by exception and laissez-faire definitions were consistent with Bass and Avolio’s (1993) 
conceptualization. The definitions used were as follows: 
Reward omission: Managers do not respond to what a subordinate perceives to be his or her good 
performance. 
Punishment omission: Managers do not respond to what a subordinate perceives to be his or her 
poor performance. 
Passive management by exception: Managers intervene only after noncompliance has occurred or 
when mistakes have already happened. 
Laissez-faire leadership: Managers avoid making decisions, abdicate responsibility, and do not use 
their authority. 
See the Appendix for the omission items; the full set of the MLQ-5X items employed cannot be reproduced, 
due to copyright restrictions. However, three of these items are presented below. We administered two 
versions of the questionnaire, with the items and pages in a different order, to control for order effects. No 
statistically significant differences were found in responses across the two versions. 
Methods of Analysis 
 In the first step of the ANOVA procedure, we calculated the mean score for each item on each of the 
four leadership dimensions. Then, we conducted a comparison of means for each item across the four 
dimensions using one-way analysis of variance and Duncan’s multiple range test. This allowed us to identify 
those items that were evaluated appropriately (i.e., to identify items that were statistically significantly 
higher [p < .01] on the appropriate dimension versus the other dimensions). 
Results 
 The results from this analysis revealed that some of the 27 items were not classified correctly. Of the 
15 MLQ items, 3 were misclassified. However, all 12 of the omission items were classified appropriately, and 
this provides evidence of their content validity. Table 2 presents the results of the analyses. 
 One of the misclassified MLQ items, MBEP-4 (“My manager tells me what I’ve done wrong rather 
than what I’ve done right”), was classified as assessing leader reward omission and passive management by 
exception.1 MBEP-6 (“My manager shows he/she is a firm believer in ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’”) was 
classified as assessing both punishment omission and passive management by exception. Finally, LF-2 (“My 
manager takes no action even when problems become chronic”) was classified as indicative of leader 
punishment omission, in addition to laissez-faire leadership. However, the remainder of the MLQ items (12 
of 15) were classified correctly, which provided evidence of their content validity. 
                                            
1  Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire Items 10 (LF-2), 28 (MBEP-4), and 44 (MBEP-6) are from Multifactor Leadership 
Questionnaire (pp.1-2), by B. M. Bass and B. J. Avolio, 1993, Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Copyright 1991 by Bernard 
M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio. Reprinted with permission. 
 As suggested in Hinkin (1998), one should create more items than would be used in the final scales when 
testing the psychometric properties of a measure (in case some of the items are not classified correctly). 
Because we were striving for parsimony (as well as adequate item content), we wanted to create measures 
with four items per dimension for future research. Consequently, we used the four items that had the 
highest mean scores on their appropriate dimensions as the best representations of omission in our 
subsequent analyses. The Appendix contains both the full and retained sets of omission items. 
Study 2: A Factor-Analytic Test of Discriminant Validity 
 Although we have advanced the argument that reward omission and punishment omission are most 
similar to the passive management by exception and laissez-faire dimensions of the MLQ, we believe that 
they are also most different from the contingent reward and contingent punishment dimensions of the 
LRPQ developed by Podsakoff and Skov and presented in full in Podsakoff et al. (1984, p. 38). The LRPQ 
consists of four subscales. Contingent reward is the leader’s positive response to desired performance, 
which is similar to the MLQ construct of the same name. Contingent punishment is the leader’s 
performance-related response to undesired behavior; it appears to be most similar to the active 
management by exception construct of the MLQ. Noncontingent reward and punishment have no parallel 
constructs in the MLQ and refer to positive (rewarding) and negative (punishing) leader behaviors that are 
unrelated to performance. The LRPQ has demonstrated an excellent factor structure and acceptable levels 
of internal consistency reliability in previous research (see Podsakoff et al., 1982, 1984, 2006), although the 
two negatively worded items of the contingent reward measure have been problematic. (As the focus of 
Study 2 was on performance-related leader behavior, LRPQ noncontingent reward and noncontingent 
punishment were not included in our analyses.) 
 Ignoring the traditional reinforcement approach (e.g., Rachlin, 1989; Skinner 1969), we could 
advance a somewhat cynical argument that reward omission is simply the absence of contingent reward and 
that punishment omission is merely the absence of contingent punishment. If this were the case, we would 
expect the contingent reward and reward omission items to load on a single factor in a factor analysis (with 
the contingent reward or reward omission items having negative loadings) and the contingent punishment 
and punishment omission items to load similarly on another factor. Consequently, to provide additional 
supportive evidence concerning the construct validity of our new measures, we wanted to see if they were 
perceived by survey respondents as independent constructs or as negatively worded contingent reward and 
punishment items. Thus, we undertook a second study that employed LISREL maximum likelihood 
confirmatory factor analysis (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2002) to assess the goodness of fit of two hierarchically 
nested rival models to the data (seeWidaman, 1985): a two-factor model and a four-factor model. 
Samples and Procedures 
 We conducted this analysis with three independent samples to increase confidence in our results. 
Sample 1 consisted of 297 midlevel managers employed at over 100 U.S. financial institutions. The average 
age of the respondents was 32 years, and 69% were male. The average professional tenure of the 
respondents was 4.3 years, and they had worked with their current supervisors for an average of 10 months. 
Over 90% of the respondents were college graduates, and all had at least some college education. The 
researchers administered survey questionnaires to the bankers at the beginning of a 2-week, industry-
sponsored management effectiveness program held at a large eastern U.S. university. Brief oral 
presentations were made to explain the purpose of the research, and the bankers were given the 
opportunity to ask questions. They were encouraged to answer all questions honestly. Participation was 
voluntary, and the sample was assured of complete anonymity. 
 Sample 2 consisted of 241 administrative and supervisory employees who worked for two U.S. hotel 
companies at various locations around the country. The average age of the respondents was 38 years, and 
53% were male. Surveys were administered at the properties and were returned directly to the researchers 
following completion. There were 42 referent managers for an average of 5.6 respondents per manager. 
Also included in the survey were the MLQ transactional leadership and laissez-faire scales, as well as 
measures of satisfaction with supervisor, supervisor effectiveness, and role clarity that are described below. 
Respondents were encouraged to answer all questions honestly. Participation was voluntary, and the 
sample was assured of complete anonymity. 
Sample 3 consisted of 261 full-time employees at all hierarchical levels of a large commercial bakery; they 
worked for a total of 38 different supervisors (average of 6.9 respondents per supervisor). The researchers 
administered the employee surveys on site, during the normal workday, and in small groups (away from the 
supervisors). Written instructions, as well as verbal instructions and assurances, were provided (along with a 
brief and general summary of the study’s purpose). The employees were requested to identify themselves 
by providing the last three digits of their employee numbers and university sponsorship, and the confiden-
tiality of their answers was emphasized. Slightly less than half of those surveyed had at least a 2-year college 
or technical degree (43.1%), and 87.2% had completed high school. The average age of the respondents was 
37.5 years, and 61% of respondents were male. 
Methods of Analysis 
 The first confirmatory model was a two-factor model; it was specified that the contingent reward 
and reward omission items loaded on the same factor and that the contingent punishment and punishment 
omission items loaded on the second factor. The second model was a four-factor model; it was specified 
that the items of each scale loaded on only the appropriate factor. This model assumes that reward and 
punishment omission are independent constructs that are separate and distinct from contingent reward and 
punishment. The measures included the four-item reward and punishment omission scales retained from 
Study 1. To maintain equality in the number of items representing each construct, we conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis of the LRPQ with the first sample and retained the four highest loading contin-
gent reward and punishment items for our subsequent sets of analyses. Respondents were asked to indicate 
the extent to which their managers exhibited the leadership behaviors using a 7-point Likert scale (from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree). Following recommended practice (see Joreskog & Sorbom, 2002; 
Widaman, 1985), we based the analyses on item covariances and employed common factor models with 
correlated factors and uncorrelated error. 
Results 
 All of the items had statistically significant factor loadings (p < .01) in both the two- and four-factor 
models in all three samples. The two-factor models revealed that the contingent reward and contingent 
punishment items had significant negative loadings and that the reward omission and punishment omission 
items had significant positive loadings. As expected, however, the chi-square results in all three samples 
clearly indicated that the four-factor model was a significantly better fit to the data (Sample 1, ∆y2(5) = 
63.98, p < .001; Sample 2, ∆X2(5) = 95.89, p < .001; Sample 3, ∆x2(5) = 165.79, p < .001). The goodness-of-fit 
results are presented in Table 3. As shown in Table 3, all of the four-factor fit indices were in the acceptable 
range for model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and all were better than were the indices for the two-factor 
models. These results support the idea that, even though these four dimensions deal with a leader’s 
response to good (reward omission and contingent reinforcement) and poor (punishment omission and 
contingent punishment) subordinate performance, the reward and punishment omission constructs are 
empirically (perceptually) separate and distinct. This, of course, is in addition to their being theoretically 
distinct from similar constructs (passive management by exception and laissez-faire leadership), as shown in 
Study 1. 
Study 3: A Test of New Scale Convergent, Discriminant, 
Concurrent, and Incremental Concurrent Validity 
Hypotheses 
 To provide additional support for the validity of the new omission constructs, we decided to 
examine their relationships with measures of similar and dissimilar constructs and their concurrent 
correlations with relevant dependent variables. For these purposes, the MLQ-5X (Bass & Avolio, 1993, 1997) 
was administered to Sample 2 (described above), along with the omission scales and three outcome 
measures. Of particular relevance in the current study are the four nontransformational behaviors that 
include contingent reward, active management by exception, passive management by exception, and 
laissez-faire leadership. 
 As discussed earlier, passive management by exception is similar to the new omission constructs in 
that it involves inaction (as long as things seem to be going all right). Similarly, laissez-faire leadership is 
characterized as generally ignoring problems and subordinate needs. Because these two dimensions are at 
least superficially similar to the omission constructs, they should be somewhat related to both. On the other 
hand, because active management by exception involves looking for subordinate mistakes and taking action 
if targets are not met, it would be expected to have either a substantially weaker or no relationship with 
both types of omission. Contingent reward behavior, characterized by the active administration of desirable 
outcomes contingent upon subordinate performance, should be inversely related to both types of nonaction 
 
(omission), because leaders who are seen as active are not likely also to be seen as inactive. Furthermore, 
contingent reward behavior should be more strongly and negatively related to reward omission than to 
punishment omission, as the same leader behavior is highly unlikely to be perceived as simultaneously 
rewarding and not rewarding subordinate performance. These expectations led to the following convergent 
and discriminant validity hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Perceived passive management by exception will be positively related to perceived 
leader reward omission (1A) and punishment omission (1B); perceived laissez-faire leadership will 
be positively related to perceived leader reward omission (1C) and punishment omission (1D). 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between perceived leader reward omission and active management 
by exception will be less than the relationship between reward omission and passive management 
by exception (2A); the relationship between perceived leader reward omission and active 
management by exception will be less than the relationship between reward omission and laissez-
faire leadership (2B); the relationship between perceived leader punishment omission and active 
management by exception will be less than the relationship between punishment omission and 
passive management by exception (2C); the relationship between perceived leader punishment 
omission and active management by exception will be less than the relationship between 
punishment omission and laissez-faire leadership (2D). 
Hypothesis 3: Perceived leader contingent reward behavior will be negatively related to perceived 
reward omission (3A) and punishment omission behavior (3B); the relationship will be stronger with 
reward omission than with punishment omission (3C). 
 With respect to dependent variables and concurrent validity, studies that used the MLQ have been 
focused on transformational leadership. Much less attention has been paid to the other non-
transformational behaviors (except for contingent reward) and their relationships with dependent variables. 
Satisfaction with supervision and perceived supervisor effectiveness have been the dependent variables 
most commonly used in studies of transactional leadership (Dumdum et al., 2002), although perceived role 
clarity has been frequently used in studies of contingent reward as measured by the LRPQ (Podsakoff et al., 
2006). Recent metaanalyses summarizing the findings of all available studies of transactional leadership 
have found that passive management by exception has negative relationships and that active management 
by exception has weak positive correlations with the satisfaction and effectiveness variables. Contingent 
reward demonstrated strong positive relationships with both variables and with role clarity, whereas laissez-
faire leadership had strong negative relationships with the satisfaction and effectiveness variables (Judge & 
Piccolo, 2004; Podsakoff et al., 2006). Reward omission would be expected to have strong negative 
relationships with perceptions of supervisor effectiveness and satisfaction with the supervisor, but the 
effects of punishment omission are less clear. Bass et al. (2003) discussed the important role that contingent 
reward and active management by exception have on clarifying follower expectations. A recent study found 
laissez-faire leadership to be strongly related to role ambiguity and role conflict (Skogstad et al., 2007). On 
the basis of our earlier discussion, we expected that both types of omission would have negative 
relationships with role clarity. 
Hypothesis 4: Perceived leader reward omission behavior will have negative relationships with 
perceptions of supervisor effectiveness (4A), satisfaction with supervision (4B), and role clarity (4C). 
Hypothesis 5: Perceived leader punishment omission behavior will have a negative relationship with 
subordinate- perceived role clarity. 
 Because the new leader omission scales tap an important aspect of leadership that we believe is not 
currently being directly measured by existing scales, we thought it desirable to test their incremental 
usefulness for the study of leadership phenomena. Bass et al. (2003) discussed the use of hierarchical 
regression to test for the augmentation effect of transformational leadership on contingent reward behavior 
in predicting performance. Employing their methodology, we used regression to determine if the omission 
constructs made a unique incremental contribution to explaining variance in the three dependent variables 
we discuss above (role clarity, satisfaction with supervision, and supervisory effectiveness). To test their 
empirical usefulness, we therefore proposed three final hypotheses for Study 3 concerning scale 
incremental concurrent validity. 
Hypothesis 6: Reward omission will be significantly related to perceived supervisor effectiveness 
after controlling for the effects of contingent reward, active and passive management by exception, 
and laissez-faire leadership. 
Hypothesis 7: Reward omission will be significantly related to satisfaction with supervision after 
controlling for the effects of contingent reward, active and passive management by exception, and 
laissez-faire leadership. 
Hypothesis 8: Reward omission (8A) and punishment omission (8B) will be significantly related to 
subordinate perceptions of role clarity after controlling for the effects of contingent reward, active 
and passive management by exception, and laissez-faire leadership. 
Sample and Measures 
 The sample consisted of the 241 hotel employees in Sample 2 (described above). The measures 
included the four-item Reward Omission and Punishment Omission scales shown in the Appendix and the 
three transactional and laissez-faire leadership dimensions of the MLQ-5X (Bass & Avolio, 1993). These 
measures employed a 5-point Likert response scale (from not at all to frequently, if not always). Satisfaction 
with the supervisor was measured with the Supervisor-Human Relations and the Supervisor-Technical Ability 
subscales (5 items apiece) of the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ; Weiss, Dawis, England, & 
Lofquist, 1967). We used this measure because it assesses satisfaction with the supervisor rather than global 
satisfaction. The 10 items were assessed on a 5-point Likert scale (from very dissatisfied to very satisfied) 
and were combined to create an overall satisfaction with supervision measure. Supervisor effectiveness was 
measured on six dimensions: technical competence, interpersonal skill, procedural justice, organizational 
influence, communication, and goal clarification. Respondents were asked to rate each of these dimensions 
on a 7-point scale (from highly ineffective to highly effective). The 6 items were then aggregated to create a 
total effectiveness measure. The role clarity measure we employed (Rizzo et al., 1970) consists of 6 items 
and measures the extent to which individuals clearly understand their task and role in the employing 
organization. 
Methods of Analysis 
 Correlation and reliability. To test Hypotheses 1 through 5, we computed Pearson correlations 
among all the variables to enable the examination of relationships among the leader behaviors and 
dependent variables. Coefficient alpha internal consistency reliabilities were computed for the measures; all 
of the scales had reliabilities that were in excess of .70 and were therefore acceptable (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). 
 Multiple regression analysis. To examine incremental concurrent validity (Hypotheses 6-8), we based 
our analyses on Bass et al. (2003) and conducted three hierarchical regression analyses. These analyses 
included all six leader behavior scales as independent variables and employed perceived supervisor 
effectiveness, satisfaction with supervision, and role clarity as the dependent variables. Following Bass et al. 
(2003), we entered all four MLQ measures and then added reward and punishment omission to the 
equation in the second and final step. 
 Common method variance and higher order factor analyses. Finally, there is always the possibility of 
artifacts with all selfreport surveys. We therefore conducted two supplemental analyses. The first was a 
higher order confirmatory factor analysis, to determine if the six leadership measures could be 
conceptualized as being merely facets of a more global perception of good or poor leadership. The second 
supplemental analysis assessed the degree to which our obtained correlation and regression results might 
be attributable to the effects of common method variance. These analyses followed the procedures 
described and recommended by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) and Williams, Ford, and 
Nguyen (2002). To test for the higher order factor, we introduced a seventh factor to our model that 
comprised the six latent leadership variables. The common method model involved adding another factor 
that comprised the indicator variables from the six leadership measures and the three dependent variables. 
Covariance matrices were the data for these analyses, and the models specified correlated factors and 
uncorrelated error; the method factor was specified as uncorrelated with the nine leadership and 
dependent variable constructs, as is recommended and common practice (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Williams et 
al., 2002). 
Results 
 Correlations. Looking first at the dependent variable correlations shown in Table 4, contingent 
reward showed a strong positive relationship with supervisor effectiveness, supervisor satisfaction, and role 
clarity, and passive management by exception and laissez-faire showed strong negative relationships. Active 
management by exception had a significant but weak negative relationship with supervisor effectiveness 
and supervisor satisfaction and a nonsignificant relationship with role clarity. These findings are very 
consistent with those of prior research on contingent reward and laissez-faire leadership, but the 
relationships between the dependent variables and both forms of management by exception are generally 
stronger than those previously reported (e.g., Dumdum et al., 2002; Judge and Piccolo, 2004; Lowe et al., 
1996). Reward omission had strong negative relationships and punishment omission had moderately strong 
negative relationships with the dependent variables. Looking at the relationship between the omission 
measures and the MLQ measures, a strong negative relationship between reward omission and contingent 
reward was apparent (as expected). Reward omission also had a strong positive relationship with passive 
management by exception and laissez- faire, and punishment omission had a moderately strong relationship 
with passive management by exception and laissez-faire. Overall, these relationships confirm Hypotheses 1 
through 5 and therefore provide support for the construct validity of the omission measures in terms of 
convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity. In the top part of Table 6, we summarize the first five 
hypotheses, report the test results pertinent to each, and indicate that each of the five hypotheses was fully 
supported by the data. 
 Regressions. As shown in Table 5, for the supervisor effectiveness dependent variable, passive 
management by exception, 
 
  
laissez-faire, contingent reward, and reward omission were all significant “predictors.” For supervisor 
effectiveness, the addition of reward omission in Step 2 increased the adjusted R2 from .57 to .62. For 
supervisor satisfaction, the same variables were again significant, and the adjusted R2 increased in Step 2 
from .49 to .56. For role clarity, only laissez-faire, contingent reward, and punishment omission were 
significant; and the adjusted R2 increased from .28 to .30 with the inclusion of punishment omission in Step 
2. 
 As we summarize in the bottom half of Table 6, these results fully support Hypotheses 6 and 7 and 
partially support Hypothesis 8. In general, the omission measures did serve to augment the effects of the 
four MLQ transactional leadership measures. The omission measures provided empirical evidence that 
supports the incremental concurrent validity of these constructs, as well as the potential importance of 
omission for inclusion in future leadership research. 
 Supplemental analyses. The results from our first set of supplemental analyses revealed that the 
confirmatory common factor model with six first-order leadership factors was a significantly better fit to the 
data than was the model with six first-order leadership factors and a second-order general leadership factor, 
∆X2(9) = 166.58, p < .001. Thus, the data do not appear to support the possibility that the respondents were 
simply reporting their conceptions of good or poor leadership using the six leadership measures that they 
completed. 
 The common method variance analyses showed that adding a method factor to the nine substantive 
construct factors (six leadership and three dependent variables) did improve model fit, ∆X2(61) = 663.84, p < 
.001; comparative fit indices, normed fit indices, and root-mean-square errors of approximation improved 
from .92, .89, and .09 to .94, .91, and .07, respectively. Computing the incremental explained variance in the 
model by squaring the standardized factor loadings revealed that the common method factor increased 
explained variance by an average of 24% per item. Further examination of the item factor loadings revealed 
that 58 of the 61 item loadings remained significant on their appropriate factor (one passive management 
by exception item, one contingent reward item, and one supervisor effectiveness item were the exceptions). 
The latent variable correlations were generally reduced by inclusion of the common method factor (see 
Table 7), but all of the relationships examined remained statistically significant, as shown in the lower 
portion of Table 7. Additionally, only the findings shown in Table 6 with respect to Hypotheses 2B and 2D 
were contradicted when we used the latent variable correlations with estimated common method variance. 
This result is partly explainable by the fact that latent variable correlations are corrected for measurement 
error. The Active Management by Exception Scale had a lower estimated scale reliability (.72) than did the 
Passive Management by Exception and Laissez-Faire Leadership Scales (.85 and .80, respectively). 
Study 4: A Further Test of New Scale Validity 
 Study 3 generally supported the convergent, discriminant, concurrent, and incremental concurrent 
validity of the new reward omission and punishment omission measures, and this remained true even after 
we controlled for common method variance artifacts. Although these results are encouraging, one 
important concern that remains unaddressed is whether the new measures have any systematic relationship 
with variables that are measured via a different data source. In particular, subordinate performance would 
seem an especially relevant variable for such an examination, because omission involves a leader’s response 
to prior subordinate performance—which may then impact on the subordinate’s future job behavior. 
 We therefore undertook Study 4 to examine relationships between subordinate-provided 
descriptions of their supervisor’s omission behavior at one time and supervisor-provided ratings of 
subordinate performance approximately 3 months later. Additionally, as we were able to collect subordinate 
descriptions of leader contingent reward and punishment behavior and satisfaction with supervision, we 
decided to further test the convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity of the new omission scales. 
 According to the reinforcement paradigm, behavior can be maintained or increased by contingent 
rewards and reduced or eliminated by contingent punishment (Luthans & Kreitner, 1985; Skinner, 1969). 
Because reward omission refers to leader behavior that does not reinforce good performance, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the omission of rewards for good performance should lead to reduced subsequent 
subordinate performance (i.e., leader reward omission should be negatively related to future subordinate 
job performance). Correspondingly, because punishment omission involves the supervisor failing to punish 
or stop poor performance, the subsequent performance of the subordinate should remain unaltered (i.e., 
leader punishment omission should be unrelated to future subordinate job performance). Because this 
latter expectation cannot be scientifically formulated (one cannot test a null hypothesis; McNemar, 1969), 
we made the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 9: Perceived leader reward omission behavior will be negatively related to subsequent 
subordinate job performance. 
Finally, because we collected data that permitted us to retest Hypotheses 3A, 3B, 3C and Hypothesis 
4B from Study 3 (see Table 6), we report these results below. 
  
Sample, Procedure, and Measures 
 Sample. The sample consisted of the 261 full-time bakery employees in Sample 3 (for a description, 
see Study 2). 
 Procedure. We employed the procedure as that in Study 2 to administer the employee survey and 
collect the employee data. Additionally, 14 weeks after the employees had completed their surveys on site, 
we asked the 38 supervisors of these respondents to complete short performance appraisals for each of 
their subordinates who had completed an employee survey. The supervisors used a master list supplied by 
the company’s human resources department to identify each employee by the last three digits of his or her 
employee number. In conformity with our briefings of the employees and supervisors (and our informed 
consent protocols), we deleted the employee numbers and all personal identification from our records and 
the data after the employee and supervisor data had been collated. 
 Measures. The reward and punishment omission measures were identical to those employed earlier 
and are shown in the Appendix. The Leader Contingent Reward and Leader Contingent Punishment scales 
were identical to those employed earlier; they were the four best items of each LRPQ scale (Podsakoff et al., 
1982, 1984, 2006), as identified in Sample 1 (see Study 2). We had the opportunity to measure employee 
satisfaction with supervisors and employed the 10 items from the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire 
(Weiss et al., 1967) used with Sample 2 in Study 3. 
 The Performance Rating scale administered to the supervisors was a 7-item measure that was based 
on a scale originally developed by Mott (1972). Previous research using this measure (e.g., Schriesheim, 
Neider, & Scandura, 1998) suggests that it has good reliability and significant correlations with other 
performance indicators (such as units produced as a percentage of standard). Two sample items are 
“Productivity-Quantity: Thinking of the various things which this person does for his/her job, how much is 
he/she producing (e.g., units produced, customers served, forms completed, pallets loaded, etc.)?” and 
“Production-Quality: How good would you say is the quality of the performance of this person? Check one.” 
The additional dimensions measured were “Production-Efficiency,” “Anticipating Problems and Solving 
Them Satisfactorily,” “Awareness of Potential New Solutions,” “Promptness of Adjustment,” and “Flexibility-
Coping With Emergencies.” At the company’s insistence, the response categories for these items were 1 
(Below Average), 2 (Average or About Average), and 3 (Above Average). 
Methods of Analysis 
 To test Hypotheses 3A, 3B, and 3C and Hypotheses 4B and 9, we computed Pearson correlations 
among the six variables to enable the examination of relationships among the four leader behaviors and two 
dependent variables. We computed coefficient alpha internal consistency reliabilities for the measures. All 
reliabilities exceeded .70 and were therefore acceptable (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Results 
 When we look at the computed correlations shown in Table 8, Hypotheses 3A, 3B, and 3C and 
Hypotheses 4B and 9 all appear to be supported. This result essentially replicates the results of Study 3. First 
and most important, perceived leader reward omission was negatively and significantly related to 
subsequent subordinate performance (r = —.20, p < .01; Hypothesis 9). Additionally, as expected but not 
hypothesized, the performance correlation for punishment omission was trivial and nonsignificant (r = .04). 
Finally, contingent reward had a moderately strong positive relationship with subsequent performance, as 
would be expected (r = .31, p < .01). 
 Hypothesis 3A predicted that the correlation between reward omission and contingent reward 
would be negative and significant, and Hypothesis 3B predicted a negative and significant correlation 
between punishment omission and contingent reward. As shown in Table 8, both of these predictions were 
supported (rs of —.70 and —.19, respectively; both ps < .01). Additionally, Hypothesis 3C predicted that the 
correlation between reward omission and contingent reward would be stronger than would the correlation 
between punishment omission and contingent reward. Again, this hypothesis was supported, t(257) = —
5.30, p < .01. Finally, Hypothesis 4B predicted a significant and negative correlation between reward 
omission and satisfaction with supervision. The results shown in Table 8 clearly support this expectation (r = 
— .53, p < .01). 
General Discussion 
 Our primary goals in this research were to examine inactive or nonresponsive leadership in more 
depth; to refine and extend the idea of a leadership reinforcement continuum proposed by Judge and 
Piccolo (2004); and to develop new scales (and provide preliminary evidence of their validity and utility) to 
measure more specific and focused nonreactive leader behavior from a reinforcement perspective, so the 
positive and negative effects of such behavior could be studied more rigorously in the future. 
 The content adequacy assessment demonstrated that leader reward and punishment omission are 
theoretically separate and distinct from each other and similar or related constructs (in particular, laissez-
faire leadership and passive management by exception). Also, the confirmatory factor analyses with three 
independent samples yielded additional evidence that supported the empirical (perceptual) distinctiveness 
of these two new constructs and thereby further supported their construct validity. 
We found additional support for the construct validity of the new omission scales. They were related (largely 
as predicted) to MLQ and LRPQ transactional and laissez-faire leadership, satisfaction with supervision, 
subordinate-perceived supervisor effectiveness, role clarity, and subsequent supervisor-rated employee 
performance. Also, the new omission scales demonstrated good internal consistency reliabilities. 
 The consistency of our correlational results for the MLQ and LRPQ subscales with prior research 
involving satisfaction, effectiveness, and role clarity (Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Podsakoff et al., 2006) allows us 
to interpret the obtained results with the omission measures as probably being generalizable and not 
sample specific. Additionally, the fact that omission augmented the effects of transactional and laissez-faire 
leadership scales in Study 3 suggests not only that these behaviors are theoretically and empirically different 
from other leadership behaviors but that they may have important independent effects on subordinate 
outcome variables. 
 Prior studies have shown that considerable variance exists in the type and amount of reinforcement 
provided to subordinates by managers. We found it possible to make predictions about relationships 
between omission and the outcome variables on the basis of theories of reinforcement, attribution, equity, 
and organizational justice and the results from earlier studies that used the MLQ and LRPQ. Omission was 
generally negatively related to satisfaction with supervision, negatively related to role clarity, and either 
negatively related or unrelated to supervisor effectiveness. These relationships suggest that not responding 
to poor performance may very well have negative effects on perceptions of supervisors by subordinates 
and, quite possibly, on subordinates’ subsequent performance. In essence, the current study demonstrates 
that subordinates in work organizations may be as sensitive to the reinforcement that they do not receive 
(but may want or feel that they deserve) as they are to the rewards and punishments that they do receive. 
 In agreement with other scholars (e.g., Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994), we have previously argued 
that level of analysis should routinely be examined in leadership research (e.g., Schriesheim, Castro, Zhou, & 
Yammarino, 2001). Unfortunately, however, our agreements with the sponsoring organizations of Samples 
1, 2, and 3 did not permit us to code or analyze the data in such a way as to allow us to use data analytic 
techniques (such as within- and between-entities analysis; Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984) to 
examine relationships at the dyad, individual-within-groups, or across-group levels. Our analyses are thus 
based strictly on methods that assume all effects are the product of individual differences (i.e., both within 
and between entities; Dansereau et al., 1984). 
 The MLQ has been in existence in various forms for about 20 years, and only now are we really 
beginning to look at its theoretical levels of analysis assumptions (cf. Schriesheim, Wu, & Scandura, 2008). 
The extant data to date suggest that most of the MLQ scales contain items that are not measuring leader 
behavior at the levels of analysis that are theoretically appropriate for these constructs. We wrote our items 
to apply to leader-subordinate relationships at the individual level of analysis (see Appendix). However, we 
certainly do not want a situation similar to that of the MLQ to hold 20 years in the future with respect to our 
new omission scales. We therefore believe that level of analysis testing should be undertaken on these new 
measures as soon as possible. 
 We believe that the leader omission constructs are most likely to operate at the individual-
differences level. This level of operation should ameliorate possible concerns about the effects uncovered 
and reported in the series of studies presented here and should make our analyses fully appropriate for 
further investigation of the research questions and hypotheses that have been investigated.  The reason 
for this belief is as follows. Although some leaders are likely to have more stylistic ways of dealing with their 
supervisory activities and responsibilities (i.e., supervisor omission behavior is likely to be at least partly a 
between-supervisors phenomenon), the reactions of their subordinates are likely to be colored by the 
subordinates’ performance perceptions and attributions (i.e., subordinate outcome variables are likely to be 
at least partly a within- supervisors phenomenon). When these two effects are combined, the likely result is 
that leadership omission correlations with various outcome criteria are likely to be both a within- and a 
between- supervisors phenomenon. As such, the leader omission correlations would be indicative of 
individual differences and would make analyses such as those performed in the current research wholly 
appropriate (Dansereau et al., 1984). Our conceptual argument and empirical results regarding the 
individual level of analysis are consistent with the vast majority of transformational/ transactional literature 
(Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, Danserau, 2005). Obviously, the above arguments support placing some degree 
of confidence in the findings of our four studies but do not negate the need for empirical investigation of 
level of analysis effects in future research on leader omission behavior. We strongly encourage such future 
research. 
Limitations 
 One issue concerning the validity of our results concerns the degree to which they are likely to be 
produced or distorted by common method variance (see Podsakoff et al., 2003). We specifically tested for 
such effects in Study 3, and, although significant common method variance effects were evident, statistically 
controlling for these effects did not wash out the majority of our findings. Additionally, we mention five 
things that should further reduce concerns about our findings being artifacts due to common method 
variance. 
 First, we used a number of procedural study design remedies that should have reduced the 
susceptibility of our data to common method bias (for example, anonymity or confidentiality and very 
strong assurances of protection; use of different questionnaire sections, instructions, and response scales 
for different measures; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Second, confirmatory factor-analytic results in the samples 
we used to test our nine substantive hypotheses clearly supported a four-factor model. Substantial common 
method variance might very well have resulted in supporting fewer factors (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
 Third, two of our dependent variables (satisfaction and subordinate-perceived supervisor 
effectiveness) are the variables most commonly used in MLQ research (Dumdum et al., 2002), and role 
clarity also is frequently used in LRPQ research on contingent reward and punishment behavior (Podsakoff 
et al., 2006). Thus, we could determine whether our results were atypical or incongruent with the extant 
literature (they clearly were not). 
 Fourth, one of the dependent variables that we employed in Study 4 was supervisor-rated employee 
performance, measured 14 weeks after the employee data were collected. Our findings with this variable 
generally supported our hypothesis (Hypothesis 9); because common method variance could not have 
confounded the results, these findings increase confidence in our conclusion that the new omission 
variables have promise for the future study of leadership processes. 
 Finally, we know of no a priori reason to expect any particular type of distortion due to our sampling 
of respondents (but it is true that any study’s results may not generalize to other settings). We utilized a 
total of four independent and very different samples in the development and testing of our new measures. 
This variance in situations, locations, and respondents can serve to ameliorate any potential context effects 
that may occur due to use of singlesample respondents, and it may also provide some confidence in the 
generalizability and robustness of our results. 
Conclusion 
 As stated by Judge and Piccolo (2004) and supported by others (e.g., Skogstad et al., 2007), inactive 
or nonleadership appears important and seems to merit further study. Until now, leader reward and 
punishment omission have not been studied in organizational settings (Komaki, 1998). It is not clear why 
these potentially important dimensions have been ignored, especially as we know the benefits of positive 
reinforcement and contingent rewards (Podsakoff et al., 2006) and the negative effects of laissez- faire 
leadership (Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Skogstad et al., 2007). It is possible that researchers and practitioners 
essentially adopt the philosophy of “no news is good news” in the belief that managers’ nonresponse to 
good and poor performance would have no effect on affective responses or future behavior. This study not 
only has supported the importance of providing performance-contingent reinforcement but has produced 
evidence of the potential harm of not providing it. Thus, although this study was exploratory and was aimed 
at opening a new stream of research on leader omission behavior, the encouraging results clearly need 
replication and extension. 
 The rigor involved in our scale development and preliminary validation processes should increase 
confidence in our results and, it is hoped, stimulate others to explore the ideas that we have tried to 
develop here. Future research should examine levels of analysis issues and the relationship of omission 
behaviors and other outcomes, particularly additional indicators of managerial and subordinate 
performance and various affective outcomes, such as organizational commitment and perceptions of 
organizational justice. However, we feel that this research can serve as a useful foundation for the 
development of future knowledge on leader omission behavior and hope that such research will be 
forthcoming. 
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Appendix 
New Omission Scale Items
 
Reward Omission 
1. I often perform well in my job and still receive no praise from my manager. (Item 5; reverse-scored 
LRPQ Item 10; 4.43) 
2. My manager often gives me no feedback when I perform well. (Item 14; 4.31) 
3. When I perform well my manager usually does nothing. (Item 7; 4.56) 
4. My good performance often goes unacknowledged by my manager. (Item 18; reverse-scored LRPQ 
Item 9; 4.50) 
5. I don’t often get praised by my manager when I perform well. (Item 19; 4.37) 
6. My good performance often gets no response from my manager. (Item 25; 4.37) 
 
Punishment Omission 
7. I seldom get criticized by my manager when I perform poorly. (Item 16; 3.97) 
8. My manager gives me no feedback when I perform poorly. (Item 8; 4.24) 
9. My poor performance often goes unacknowledged by my manager. (Item 20; 4.13) 
10. When I perform poorly in my job I receive no criticism from my manager. (Item 4; 4.18) 
11. When I perform poorly my manager does nothing. (Item 22; 4.28) 
12. My poor performance often gets no response from my manager. (Item 3; 4.27) 
Note. Italicized items were not retained for subsequent analyses on the basis of the content adequacy 
assessment. The numbers in parentheses indicate the order in which the items appeared on the content 
adequacy assessment instrument and the mean content adequacy score (on a 1-5 scale) for each item on its 
appropriate definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
